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Introduction
A nurse believes that her employer, a hospital, is defrauding the
government by submitting claims to Medicare and Medicaid for services
the hospital never provided. In her complaint, the nurse alleges that
the hospital participated in duplicative and unnecessary testing of
patients and duplicative billing for blood draws. She also includes
factual references to her personal conversations about the hospital’s
policies with other employees, descriptions and technical codes for
medical tests of the type that she alleged were falsely submitted, and
the testing histories of two actual patients. However, she cannot provide
billing numbers, specific dates, or copies of any bill that was sent to the
government for these false claims. Instead, she has personal, firsthand
knowledge of the submission of the false claims—her supervisors
informed her of the details of the scheme to induce her to participate
in the fraud.

235

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 1·2015
Relaxing Rule 9(b)

Based on the facts given above, the Eleventh Circuit would likely
find her complaint insufficient due to lack of details about the actual
false claims submitted, such as dates and amounts.1 On the other hand,
the Fifth Circuit would probably find her complaint sufficient because
her personal knowledge of the scheme provides indicia of reliability that
the false claims were actually submitted.2
An engineer wishes to bring a suit for falsely certifying and shipping
parts that did not meet the government’s specifications against a
company that manufactures equipment for the armed forces. He works
for a competitor of this company, so he has no personal knowledge of
the fraudulent acts or access to any of the company’s invoices or billing
information. In his complaint, the engineer alleges which specific parts
were shipped and paid for by the government. He also provides information about the contract between the company and the government. He
alleges that the company must have submitted at least one false claim
or the government would not have paid for the inadequate equipment.
Without details of the actual false claims submitted—such as copies
of invoices—the Eleventh Circuit would likely find the engineer’s
complaint insufficient.3 The Fifth Circuit may also find his complaint
insufficient because, even though he provided details of the overall
scheme to submit false claims to the government, he did not provide
any other indicia of reliability to support his claims. 4 However, the
Seventh Circuit would likely find the complaint sufficient because it
provided enough detail of the overall scheme to infer that the false
claims were actually submitted.5
These hypotheticals illustrate the division among the circuit courts
in deciding cases brought under the False Claims Act (FCA).6 The FCA
is aimed at uncovering fraud against the United States Government
1.

See, e.g., United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d
1301, 1311–13 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that the rule requiring that
averments of fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity applies
to FCA claims and that the competitor failed to allege with specificity if
or when the corporation submitted any improper claims to the government).

2.

See, e.g., United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180,
190–91 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that the claim was stated with sufficient
particularity without including contents of the bill, exact dollar amounts,
or dates to prove by a preponderance that fraudulent bills were actually
submitted).

3.

Supra, note 1.

4.

Supra, note 2.

5.

See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 570 F.3d 849,
854 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that a relator from a competitor did not need
to produce invoices that the defendant company submitted to customers
at the beginning of a lawsuit since knowledge can be inferred).

6.

31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012).
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through suits brought by private citizens called relators. While Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b),7 which requires a heightened pleading
standard in instances of fraud, governs complaints under the FCA, the
circuit courts are split in their application of Rule 9(b) to this scenario.
The circuits’ applications range from rigid to flexible applications of
Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement. Because the Supreme Court has
declined to address this issue and because there is no single test that
courts can use to decide whether a complaint is sufficient, courts have
come to widely disparate decisions. This Note proposes a test under
which Rule 9(b) will be satisfied by a complaint filed under the FCA
that (1) pleads sufficient detail of a fraudulent scheme and (2) provides
reliable indicia of fraudulent claims to conclude that false claims have
been filed.
First, this Note will discuss the FCA, contemplating its
requirements and purpose. The Rule 9(b) pleading standard will be
examined in general and as it applies to the FCA. Second, this Note
will examine how the circuit courts have chosen to apply the Rule 9(b)
pleading standard to FCA complaints, discussing the courts’ holdings
within a spectrum of rigid to flexible applications of that rule to
highlight the inconsistency surrounding this issue. Third, this Note will
suggest that the pleading standard be relaxed in FCA cases to improve
access to the judicial system for relators and avoid the informational
asymmetry problem.
Fourth, this Note will propose a test for courts to use when
evaluating FCA complaints and propose factors that courts should
consider when determining if reliable indicia have been provided.
Finally, this Note will suggest that the “representative samples”
approach and the “status of the relator” approach should be rejected in
favor of the flexible approach. Not only will evaluating FCA complaints
under this test fulfill the purpose behind the enactment of Rule 9(b),
but it will also improve access to the judicial system for relators and
allow the FCA to fulfill its remedial purpose. Courts should apply Rule
9(b) flexibly to avoid the unfair burden that a rigid application places
on relators. This Note promotes a flexible application of Rule 9(b) in
FCA cases and works to clarify the factors courts should consider when
applying a flexible application of Rule 9(b) in FCA cases.

I.

Overview of the False Claims Act &
the Pleading Requirement

The FCA is an extremely important tool in uncovering fraud
against the United States Government; its goal is to “supplement
federal law enforcement resources by encouraging private citizens to
7.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
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uncover fraud on the government.” 8 Because the FCA is a federal
statute, a complaint filed pursuant to the FCA is analyzed for
sufficiency under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).9
A.

The False Claims Act

The FCA aims to “protect[] the federal fisc by imposing severe
penalties on those whose false or fraudulent claims cause the
government to pay money.”10 Congress passed the FCA in 1863 to crack
down on fraud perpetrated by Union Army suppliers in government
defense contracts during the Civil War.11 The FCA encourages private
citizens, called relators, to file qui tam12 cases reporting attempts to
defraud the government.13 The increase in qui tam cases filed in the last
two decades is dramatic. For example, in 1987 only 30 qui tam cases
were filed, but in 2013, 753 qui tam cases were filed, resulting in
recoveries of over $3 billion.14 One of the principal uses of the FCA is
to battle fraud in the health-care field, covering false claims submitted
to Medicare and Medicaid by health-care providers.15 A relator who
successfully submits a claim of fraud will receive between fifteen and
twenty-five percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement. 16
Recovery under the FCA can be substantial; for example, “[t]he
8.

United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, Inc., 507 F.3d 720, 727 (1st Cir. 2007).

9.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).

10.

United States ex rel. Vigil v. Nelnet, Inc., 639 F.3d 791, 796 (8th Cir. 2011).

11.

See United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 184 (5th
Cir. 2009) (“The Act is remedial, first passed at the behest of President
Lincoln in 1863 to stem widespread fraud by private Union Army
suppliers in Civil War defense contracts.”).

12.

Qui tam is an abbreviation of qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso
in hac parte sequitur, which means “who as well for the king as for himself
sues in this matter.” Qui Tam Action, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th
ed. 2014). A qui tam is a lawsuit brought by a private citizen against a
person or company who is believed to have violated the law in the
performance of a contract with the government or in violation of a
government regulation. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2012) (“A person
may bring a civil action for a violation of section 3729 for the person and
for the United States Government.”).

13.

31 U.S.C. § 3730 allows only the U.S. Attorney General or a private citizen
action as a whistleblower to file under the FCA. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2012).
United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, Inc., 507 F.3d 720, 726–27 (1st Cir. 2007).

14.

Fraud Statistics Overview Oct. 1, 1987–Sept. 30, 2013, Civil Div., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2013
/12/26/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf [http://perma.cc/2QDCVUQG]
(last visited Sept. 9, 2015).

15.

See Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 692 (2d Cir. 2001).

16.

31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2012).
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healthcare industry alone accounted for over $9.5 billion in recoveries
by the U.S. Department of Justice” from 2009 to 2012.17
Generally, the FCA “indicate[s] a purpose to reach any person who
knowingly assisted in causing the government to pay claims which were
grounded in fraud, without regard to whether that person had direct
contractual relations with the government.”18 The FCA holds liable any
person who (1) knowingly submits false claims to the government; (2)
causes another to submit false claims; (3) conspires to violate the FCA;
or (4) knowingly makes or uses a false record to get a false claim paid
by the Government.19
Consequently, “[t]he statute attaches liability, not to the underlying
fraudulent activity or to the government’s wrongful payment, but to
the ‘claim for payment.’ Therefore, a central question in False Claims
Act cases is whether the defendant ever presented a ‘false or fraudulent
claim’ to the government.”20 Liability is not triggered simply by submitting a false claim; the potentially liable party must have knowledge that
they are submitting a false claim. 21 The FCA defines knowledge as
“actual knowledge,” “deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the
information,” or “reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information;” however, proof of specific intent to defraud is not required.22 A
person found liable for this conduct must pay a civil penalty between
$5,000 and $10,000 plus three times the amount of the government’s

17.

Martin Merritt & Rachel V. Rose, Pleading “Healthcare Fraud and
Abuse” Under the False Claims Act, Surviving Rule 9(b) and Rule
12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss, Fed. Lawyer, May 2013, at 63, available
at http://www.slideshare.net/MartinMerritt2/pleading-healthcare-fraudand-abuse-rule-9b-12-b-6-merritt-rose-05-13?from_action=save
[http://perma.cc/U8ES-HBMX] (referencing statistics from the Office
of Public Affairs of U.S. Dept. of Justice).

18.

United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 544–55 (1943).

19.

31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(G) (2012). The FCA also holds liable any
person who: (1) has control over government property and knowingly
delivers less than all of that property; (2) is authorized to deliver a
document certifying receipt of property used by the Government and
delivers it without completely knowing that the information on the receipt
is true; and (3) knowingly buys public property from a Government
employee who may not sell the property. Id.

20.

Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 785 (4th
Cir. 1999) (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Rivera, 55 F.3d 703,
709 (1st Cir. 1995)).

21.

United States ex rel. Owens v. First Kuwaiti Gen. Trading & Contracting
Co., 612 F.3d 724, 728 (4th Cir. 2010) (“Congress . . . has made plain
its intention that the act not punish honest mistakes or incorrect claims
submitted through mere negligence.”).

22.

31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1) (2012).
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damages.23 In order to successfully bring a qui tam action, a relator
must meet the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9(b).
B.

The Rule 9(b) Pleading Standard

Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that“[i]n
alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge,
and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”24
The Rule 9(b) requirement must be read in conjunction with
Rule 8(a), which requires a short and plain statement of the claim.25
Therefore, merely focusing on the fact that Rule 9(b) requires
particularity fails to take into account “the general simplicity and flexibility” contemplated by Rule 8(a).26 When read in conjunction with
Rule 8(a), it becomes clear that Rule 9(b) does not require absolute
particularity.27 Many courts require a relator under the FCA to allege
the time, place, and content of the fraud as well as allegations that the
false claim was actually submitted to the government.28
The main purpose of Rule 9(b) is to apprise defendants of the
fraudulent claims and acts that form the basis for a claim. 29 The

23.

31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2012).

24.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).

25.

See United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 185–86
(5th Cir. 2009) (“The particularity demanded by Rule 9(b) is
supplemental to the Supreme Court’s recent interpretation of Rule 8(a)
requiring ‘enough facts [taken as true] to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’”); Barney J. Finberg, Annotation, Construction and
Application of Provision of Rule 9(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
That Circumstances Constituting Fraud or Mistake be Stated with
Particularity, 27 A.L.R. Fed. 407, §2[a] (1976); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

26.

5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 1298 (3d ed. 2004).

27.

Id.; see United States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 1386 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (quoting 2A James William Moore, Federal Practice § 9.03,
at 9-28 (2d ed. 1980)) (footnote omitted) (“[T]he requirement of particularity
does not abrogate Rule 8 . . . it should be harmonized with . . . subdivisions (a) and (e) of Rule 8.”); see also Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 185–86 (stating
that Rule 9(b) supplements but does not supplant Rule 8(a)).

28.

See, e.g., United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d
1301, 1311–13 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that fraud or mistake claims
under the FCA must be stated with particularity and that a competitor
failed to allege with specificity if or when a corporation submitted any
improper claims to the government).

29.

See Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 735 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing
Gottreich v. San Francisco Investment Corp., 552 F.2d 866 (9th Cir.
1977)) (holding that pleading under Rule 9(b) “is sufficient if it identifies
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particularity requirement also protects against vexatious and frivolous
claims. 30 All circuit courts that have considered the issue have
concluded that Rule 9(b) should apply to qui tam actions under the
FCA.31 However, “the degree of particularity necessary to enable the
pleading to withstand attack . . . must in practical application necessarily vary with the facts and circumstances of each case.”32 According
to the D.C. Circuit, “Rule 9(b) is mitigated by Rule 8’s short and plain
statement language, and the simplicity and flexibility contemplated by
the rules must be taken into account when reviewing a complaint for
9(b) particularity.” 33 The debate over what degree of particularity
should be applied in FCA cases has caused a circuit split.

II. Circuit Court Application of the
Rule 9(B) Standard
When analyzing circuit court decisions in FCA cases, the need for
a uniform test becomes apparent. The circuit courts are split in their
application of Rule 9(b) to claims filed under the FCA. The circuits
range from a flexible application of Rule 9(b) to a strict adherence to
the Rule’s particularity requirement. For example, the First Circuit
held that Rule 9(b) may be satisfied even where “some questions
remain unanswered [but] the complaint as a whole is sufficiently particular to pass muster under the FCA.”34 However, the Eleventh Circuit
strictly applied Rule 9(b) to require that relators plead specific details
as to time, place, and substance of the fraudulent acts as well as who

‘the circumstances constituting fraud so that the defendant can prepare
an adequate answer from the allegations’”).
30.

See United States ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 389 F.3d
1251, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding general allegations of FCA violations
by failing to comply with certification requirements under the Truth
Negotiations Act and the accompanying FAR regulating government
contracts did not state a claim with sufficient particularity).

31.

E.g., United States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552,
556 (8th Cir. 2006); Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 185; United States ex rel.
Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d 220 (1st Cir. 2004).

32.

Finberg, supra note 25; see also Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 188 (5th Cir. 2009)
(citing Williams v. WMX Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1997))
(“[W]e have acknowledged that ‘Rule 9(b)’s ultimate meaning is contextspecific,’ and thus there is no single construction of Rule 9(b) that applies
in all contexts.”).

33.

United States ex rel. McCready v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 251
F. Supp. 2d 114, 117 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing United States ex rel. Joseph
v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 1385–86 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).

34.

United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, Inc., 507 F.3d 720, 732 (1st Cir. 2007)
(citing Karvelas, 360 F.3d at 233 n.17).
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engaged in them.35 There have been no guiding principles established
which courts can use to decide whether a complaint satisfies Rule 9(b).
The result is that courts fall along a spectrum of rigid to flexible application of the particularity requirement and consider many different
variables such as the status of the relator, reliability of information,
notice to the defendant, and personal knowledge.
A complaint filed under the FCA that (1) pleads sufficient detail of
a fraudulent scheme and (2) provides reliable indicia of fraudulent
claims to conclude that false claims have been filed should satisfy the
requirements of Rule 9(b). All courts should consider similar factors
when determining if reliable indicia have been provided. Finally—
although many courts take it into consideration—the relationship the
relator has to the defendant is immaterial to that determination. The
circuits that have addressed pleading requirements under the FCA take
three main approaches: (1) the representative samples approach—an
inflexible application of Rule 9(b); (2) the status of the relator
approach; and (3) the flexible approach.
A.

The Representative Samples Approach

A few circuits rigidly apply Rule 9(b), requiring relators to plead
specific details of individual instances of fraud, often referred to as the
representative samples approach.36
The Eleventh Circuit applies the most inflexible application of
Rule 9(b). In United States ex rel. Clausen v. Laboratory Corp. of
America,37 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a relator’s
complaint for failure to meet the Rule 9(b) standard.38 Here, the court,
while declining to apply a more flexible standard, suggested that a
complaint is sufficient if it pleads an overall scheme and indicia of
reliability. 39 The Clausen court, however, made it clear that the
complaint would satisfy the indicia of reliability only if the complaint

35.

See United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301,
1311–13 (11th Cir. 2002) (requiring “some indicia of reliability” in the
complaint sufficient “to support the allegation of an actual false claim for
payment being made to the Government”).

36.

A representative sample, generally, is a specific example of false claims
submitted to the government for payment. Many courts specify that a
representative sample details the “time, place, and content” of the false
claims. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharm. N. Am.,
Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 455–56 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding “that the district court
properly dismissed the amended complaint” for failure to properly allege
that “false claims were presented to the government for payment”).

37.

290 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2002).

38.

Id. at 1315.

39.

Id. at 1311.
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included allegations of the specific contents of actually submitted
claims, such as billing numbers, dates, and amounts.40
Many circuits only require representative samples in some
situations. The Fourth Circuit requires representative samples only
“when a defendant’s actions, as alleged and as reasonably inferred from
the allegations, could have led, but need not necessarily have led, to
the submission of false claims.”41 In United States ex rel. Nathan v.
Takeda Pharmaceuticals North America, Inc., 42 the court explicitly
declined to apply a “relaxed construction of Rule 9(b).”43 Even though
the relator alleged that doctors wrote almost one hundred prescriptions
for the drug in question, he failed to allege that the prescriptions were
written for off-label uses or that patients ever filled the prescriptions.44
Overall, the court found that the complaint was insufficient because it
could not draw a plausible inference connecting the general statistics
alleged to the prescriptions identified.45 The court determined that the
allegations in the complaint were too general because the relator did
not “identify with particularity any claims that would trigger liability
under the Act.”46
Similarly, the First Circuit requires a relator to provide at least
some representative samples:
[A] relator must provide details that identify particular false
claims for payment that were submitted to the government. In a
case such as this, details concerning the dates of the claims, the
content of the forms or bills submitted, their identification numbers, the amount of money charged to the government, the particular goods or services for which the government was billed, the
individuals involved in the billing, and the length of time between
the alleged fraudulent practices and the submission of claims
based on those practices are the types of information that may
help a relator to state his or her claims with particularity. These
details do not constitute a checklist of mandatory requirements
that must be satisfied by each allegation included in a complaint.
However, . . . we believe that “some of this information for at

40.

Id. at 1311–13.

41.

Nathan, 707 F.3d at 457.

42.

707 F.3d 451 (4th Cir. 2013).

43.

Id. at 457–58.

44.

Id. at 459–60.

45.

Id. at 459.

46.

Id. at 460.
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least some of the claims must be pleaded in order to satisfy
Rule 9(b).”47

While these circuits have rigidly applied Rule 9(b) to FCA cases,
other circuits have taken a more lenient approach.
B.

The Status of the Relator Approach

Several circuits apply a flexible interpretation of Rule 9(b) only
when the court deems the relator to have some level of “insider”
status—that is the relator has personal, firsthand knowledge of the
submission of false claims to the government.48 In United States ex rel.
Thayer v. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland,49 the Eighth Circuit
held that a relator with personal, firsthand knowledge of the submission
of false claims can satisfy Rule 9(b) without representative examples
by pleading “particular details of a scheme to submit false claims paired
with reliable indicia that lead to a strong inference that claims were
actually submitted.”50 The court compared this holding with its holding
in United States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hospital,51 where it held that
“to satisfy Rule 9(b), [the relator] was required to plead at least some
representative examples of the false claims” because he “had no direct
connection to the hospital’s billing or claims department and could only
speculate that false claims were submitted.”52 While Thayer oversaw
Planned Parenthood’s billing and claims systems and, therefore, had
47.

United States ex rel. Ge v. Takeda Pharm. Co., 737 F.3d 116, 123 (1st
Cir. 2013) (citing United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield
Hosp., 360 F.3d 220, 232–33 (1st Cir. 2004)).

48.

Status of the relator refers to the way many courts categorize a relator as
either an “insider” or “outsider” depending on what position they hold
within the company or organization. For example, some courts would
consider an employee of the billing department as an insider, but a doctor
in the same hospital an “outsider.” Compare United States ex rel. Thayer
v. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 765 F.3d 914 (8th Cir. 2014)
(the relator was the center of the defendant clinic and oversaw the billing
and claims system of defendant clinic) with United States ex rel. Joshi v.
St. Luke’s Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552 (8th Cir. 2006) (the relator anesthesiologist was held not to be privy to certain details related to his claims).
Although this categorization of relators is wholly irrelevant, the terms
“relator” or “outsider” as used throughout this Note do not include
relators who receive information to bring an FCA claim through public
knowledge and would thus fall under the Original Source provision of 31
U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4). See Hays v. Hoffman, 325 F.3d 982, 986–87 (8th Cir.
2003) (discussing whether the relator’s factual allegations were drawn
from publicly disclosed information and thus barred).

49.

765 F.3d 914 (8th Cir. 2014).

50.

Id. at 918.

51.

441 F.3d 552 (8th Cir. 2006).

52.

Thayer, 765 F.3d at 917 (discussing Joshi, 441 F.3d at 557).
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firsthand knowledge of the false claims, Joshi was an anesthesiologist
with no direct connection to the hospital’s billing department.53 The
Eighth Circuit applies a more lenient pleading standard when the
relator has personal, firsthand knowledge of the actual submission of
the false claims; therefore, a doctor in the hospital would have to provide representative samples, but an employee of the billing department
would not, simply because of his status or relationship to the defendant.
Although the Sixth Circuit generally requires a relator to plead
“‘characteristic example[s]’ that are ‘illustrative of [the] class’ of all
claims covered by the fraudulent scheme,”54 in United States ex rel.
Chesbrough v. VPA, P.C.,55 the court did not foreclose the possibility
of a relaxed pleading standard for a relator with firsthand knowledge:
The case law just discussed suggests that the requirement that a
relator identify an actual false claim may be relaxed when, even
though the relator is unable to produce an actual billing or
invoice, he or she has pled facts which support a strong inference
that a claim was submitted. Such an inference may arise when
the relator has “personal knowledge that the claims were submitted by Defendants . . . for payment.”56

On the other hand, the D.C. Circuit allows some flexibility for a
relator who does not have personal, firsthand knowledge. The court in
United States ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co.57 held that
“Rule 9(b) does not require plaintiffs to allege every fact pertaining to
every instance of fraud when a scheme spans several years.”58 The court
allowed some flexibility for certain relators stating that “[i]t is certainly
true that qui tam plaintiffs . . . often have difficulty getting access to .
. . documents. Accordingly, this circuit provides an avenue for plaintiffs
unable to meet the particularity standard because defendants control
the relevant documents—plaintiffs in such straits may allege lack of
access in the complaint.”59
These circuits recognize the advantages of a more flexible pleading
standard. The D.C. Circuit in particular recognizes the prejudice to
relators that can result from informational asymmetry. There are,
53.

Id. at 917.

54.

United States ex rel. Snapp, Inc., v. Ford Motor Co., 532 F.3d 496, 506
(6th Cir. 2008).

55.

United States ex rel. Chesbrough v. VPA, P.C., 655 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2011).

56.

Id. at 471 (quoting United States ex rel. Lane v. Murfreesboro
Dermatology Clinic, PLC, 2010 WL 1926131, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. 2010)).

57.

389 F.3d 1251 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

58.

Id. at 1259.

59.

Id. at 1258.
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however, several circuits that apply Rule 9(b) flexibly in all situations,
not just in certain circumstances.
C.

The Flexible Approach

Several circuits always allow a flexible pleading standard for an
FCA relator. For example, the Third Circuit addressed the pleading
requirement in United States ex rel. Foglia v. Renal Ventures
Management LLC,60 where the relator alleged that the defendant overbilled the government for a certain prescription drug.61 Although the
court recognized this was a “close case as to meeting the requirements
of Rule 9(b),” the court found that the complaint was sufficient and
rejected the representative samples approach.62 The court stated that,
accepting the relator’s factual allegations as true, there were records
showing that less than a normal amount of the drug was used and that
Medicare would reimburse for a full vial of the drug regardless of how
much was used, thus providing an opportunity for the alleged fraud.63
Stating that “it is hard to reconcile the text of the FCA, which does
not require that the exact content of the false claims in question be
shown, with the ‘representative samples’ standard,”64 the court noted
that “we had never ‘held that a plaintiff must identify a specific claim
for payment at the pleading stage of the case to state a claim for
relief.’”65
The Tenth Circuit held that a plaintiff is not required to “provide
a factual basis for every allegation.”66 In United States ex rel. Lemmon
v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc.,67 the relators observed and participated in
the improper disposal of hazardous waste.68 The court held that as long
60.

United States ex rel. Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt. LLC, 754 F.3d 153
(3d Cir. 2014).

61.

Id. at 158.

62.

Id.

63.

Id.

64.

Id. at 156.

65.

Id. (citing United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Group, Inc., 659
F.3d 295, 308 (3d Cir. 2011)). The Third Circuit also referenced that Fifth
Circuit’s holding in Grubbs that “requiring this sort of detail at the
pleading stage would be ‘one small step shy of requiring production of
actual documentation with the complaint, a level of proof not demanded
to win at trial and significantly more than any federal pleading rule
contemplates.’” Id. (citing United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti,
565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir. 2009)).

66.

United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 614 F.3d 1163,
1173 (10th Cir. 2010).

67.

614 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2010).

68.

Id. at 1166.
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as the relator provides (1) details of the fraudulent scheme and (2) “an
adequate basis for a reasonable inference that false claims were
submitted” the Rule 9(b) standard has been met.69
Similarly, a relator in the Fifth Circuit need not allege details of
each false claim, but the relator must “provide other reliable indications
of fraud and . . . plead a level of detail that demonstrates that an alleged
scheme likely resulted in bills submitted for government payment.”70 In
United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti,71 the relator alleged that
two doctors personally instructed him to contribute to a fraudulent
billing scheme.72 In his complaint, the relator described the scheme in
detail as well as “one overt act of false billing for each doctor.”73 The
court held that the complaint could “survive by alleging particular
details of a scheme to submit false claims paired with reliable indicia
that lead to a strong inference that claims were actually submitted.”74
When the logical conclusion of the allegations of a relator’s complaint
is that false claims were presented to the government, it is sufficient
under Rule 9(b) “even though it does not include exact billing numbers
or amounts.”75
The Ninth Circuit adopted a flexible application of Rule 9(b) in
United States ex rel. Ebeid v. Lungwitz.76 Notably, the court held that
the relator must plead (1) “particular details of a scheme to submit
false claims” and (2) “reliable indicia that lead to a strong inference
that claims were actually submitted.” 77 The court does not require
relators to provide representative samples; instead, representative
samples are simply one way of meeting the reliable indicia prong of the
test.78 Even though the court acknowledged that a somewhat flexible
pleading standard would apply, it found the relator’s complaint
insufficient. The relator merely alleged that certain health care businesses “were engaged in the unlawful corporate practice of medicine.”79
The court noted that the relator “baldly assert[ed]” that, had the
69.

Id. at 1172.

70.

United States ex rel. Nunnally v. West Calcasieu Cameron Hospital, 519
F. App’x 890, 893 (5th Cir. 2013).

71.

United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180 (5th Cir. 2009).

72.

Id. at 184.

73.

Id. at 184–85.

74.

Id. at 190.

75.

Id. at 192.

76.

United States ex rel. Ebeid v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2010).

77.

Id. at 998–99 (citing Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 190).

78.

Id. at 998.

79.

Id. at 1000.
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defendant “not concealed or failed to disclose information affecting the
right to payment, the United States would not have paid the claims”
without providing “any statute, rule, regulation, or contract that
conditions payment on compliance with state law governing the
corporate practice of medicine.” 80 Because the relator’s complaint
contained only conclusory allegations “lacking any details or facts
setting out the ‘who, what, when, where, and how’ of the ‘financial
relationship’ or alleged referrals,” his complaint was insufficient.81
Finally, the Seventh Circuit in United States ex rel. Lusby v. RollsRoyce Corp. 82 rejected the notion that representative samples are
required, reversing a district court holding that the relator needed to
have “at least one of [defendant’s] billing packages” to meet the
Rule 9(b) standard. 83 The defendant argued that the relator’s complaint was insufficient because, although he was an engineer for the
company, he was not an insider and did not have access to invoices sent
to customers.84 The court found the relator’s statement that “Rolls–
Royce must have submitted at least one such certificate [of compliance],
or the military services would not have paid for the goods” as sufficient,
85
holding that because “knowledge is inferential,” it is enough to “show,
in detail, the nature of the charge, so that vague and unsubstantiated
accusations of fraud do not lead to costly discovery and public
obloquy.”86 Even though the relator did not have personal knowledge
of the details of the particular fraudulent claims, the Seventh Circuit
found that the complaint was sufficient because it alleged the scheme.87

III. A More Flexible Standard Fulfills the Purpose
behind Rule 9(B) and Provides Fair Access to the
Judicial System for Relators
The confusion and discord surrounding pleading requirements in
FCA cases arises from the lack of a definitive test to determine the
sufficiency of a complaint and the lack of identifiable factors that courts
can weigh when applying the test. Many courts have stated that a
relator must show details of the scheme and some indicia of reliability;
however, the courts that have adopted this test interpret indicia of
80.

Id.

81.

Id.

82.

United States ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 570 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 2009).

83.

Id. at 854.

84.

Id.

85.

Id. at 854–55.

86.

Id. (citing United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301,
1310 (11th Cir. 2002)).

87.

Id. at 854.
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reliability differently and, therefore, have varied results. Further, many
courts have incorrectly allowed the status of the relator to affect the
pleading requirement. All courts should consider the same factors when
determining what constitutes indicia of reliability, and they should
reject the representative samples and status of the relator approaches.
Applying a uniform, flexible test will prevent courts from placing an
unfair pleading burden on relators while still satisfying the Rule 9(b)
pleading requirement.
A.

A Flexible Application of Rule 9(b) Provides Notice to the
Defendant and Does Not Unfairly Prejudice Relators

Rule 9(b) “is context specific and flexible and must remain so to
achieve the remedial purpose of the False Claims Act.”88 Fulfilling the
purpose behind Rule 9(b) is essential in evaluating an FCA complaint.
Rule 9(b) strives mainly to put defendants on notice and allow them
to prepare an appropriate defense. 89 Further, it serves to protect
defendants from frivolous claims and deter cases filed purely for settlement value, merely to reopen a completed transaction, or only to obtain
discovery.90 Therefore, “[a] court should hesitate to dismiss a complaint
under Rule 9(b) if the court is satisfied (1) that the defendant has been
made aware of the particular circumstances for which she will have to
prepare a defense at trial, and (2) that plaintiff has substantial
prediscovery evidence of those facts.”91
To achieve the purpose behind Rule 9(b), the pleading standard
must remain flexible in FCA cases. Without flexibility, the “remedial
purpose” of the FCA cannot be achieved.92 Namely, “[w]e reach for a
workable construction of Rule 9(b) with complaints under the False
Claims Act; that is, one that effectuates Rule 9(b) without stymieing
legitimate efforts to expose fraud.”93 A flexible application of Rule 9(b)
in which a relator must satisfy the two-part test of (1) pleading details
88.

United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir. 2009).

89.

Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 735 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Gottreich
v. San Franscisco Inv. Corp., 552 F.2d 866, 866 (9th Cir. 1977)).

90.

Charis Ann Mitchell, Comment, A Fraudulent Scheme’s Particularity
Under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 Liberty U.
L. Rev. 337, 344 (2010); see United States ex rel. Folliard v. CDW Tech.
Servs. Inc., 722 F. Supp. 2d 20, 25 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that Rule 9(b)
is meant to ensure that defendants have a chance to prepare their defense
and to discourage fraud claims solely as a pretext for discovery of
unknown wrongs or purely for nuisance value).

91.

United States ex rel. McCready v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 251
F. Supp. 2d 114, 116 (D.D.C. 2003) (quoting Harrison v. Westinghouse
Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 784 (4th Cir. 1999)).

92.

Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 190.

93.

Id.
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of the overall scheme and (2) presenting sufficient indicia of reliability
strikes a balance that protects defendants while preventing plaintiff
from filing baseless claims.94 The test is flexible enough to not preclude
meritorious claims from going forward while providing defendants adequate notice of the claims.
Further, a complaint that complies with the flexible, two-part test
would limit any “fishing” as the Fifth Circuit explained:
Discovery can be pointed and efficient, with a summary judgment
following on the heels of the complaint if billing records discredit
the complaint’s particularized allegations. That is the balance
Rule 9(b) attempts to strike. And it works best when access to
discovery does not inevitably include all discovery’s powers but is
tailored by the district court to the case at hand. And the detail
must be sufficient to allow this tailoring. Rule 9(b) should not be
made to shoulder all the burden of policing abusive discovery.95

In Grubbs, the Fifth Circuit found that a requirement that a relator
plead representative samples such as “exact dollar amounts, billing
numbers, or dates” is “one small step shy of requiring production of
actual documentation”—a level of proof not demanded by the
Rule 9(b) standard—and, therefore, rejected an inflexible application
of the Rule.96
In Foglia, the Third Circuit relied on the Attorney General’s brief
for the United States as amicus curiae in Nathan to add further support
for its finding that a flexible pleading standard should apply.97 In the
brief, the Attorney General stated that (1) the “rigid” pleading standard is “unsupported by Rule 9(b)”; (2) “a strict pleading standard
undermines the FCA’s effectiveness as a tool to combat fraud against
the United States”; and (3) “pleading the details of a specific false claim
94.

Id.

95.

Id. at 191.

96.

Id. at 189–90 (citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551
U.S. 308 (2007)); United States ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs.
of Am., Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 258, 269 (D.D.C. 2002) (“If at trial a qui
tam plaintiff proves the existence of a billing scheme and offers particular
and reliable indicia that false bills were actually submitted as a result of
the scheme—such as dates that services were fraudulently provided or
recorded, by whom, and evidence of the department’s standard billing
procedure—a reasonable jury could infer that more likely than not the
defendant presented a false bill to the government, this despite no
evidence of the particular contents of the misrepresentation.”).

97.

United States ex rel. Foglia v. Renal Ventures Management LLC, 754
F.3d 153, 156 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 10–11, United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharm.
N. Am., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1759 (2014) (No. 12–1249) (mem.) (denying cert.
to 707 F.3d 451)).
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presented to the government is not an indispensable requirement of a
viable FCA complaint.”98
The Third Circuit agreed that a more “nuanced” standard fulfills
the purpose behind Rule 9(b) of providing fair notice to defendants of
a plaintiff’s claims without prejudicing the relator.99 A defendant will
be able to adequately defend against the claim because many times the
defendant is the party who is in possession of the records that are
necessary to show that the alleged false claims were never billed for.100
If a relator is prevented from going forward with his claim simply
because he does not have access to the information needed to provide
representative samples in his complaint, a meritorious claim may be
dismissed. In other words, “[f]actual sufficiency is . . . a poor proxy for
meritlessness. . . . It overscreens cases that, though meritorious, cannot
meet the fact pleading standard before discovery.” 101 Further, “[t]he
overscreening effect is a significant inroad into justice concerns because
it prevents deserving plaintiffs from gaining meaningful access to the
civil justice system.”102 If a meritorious claim cannot get past the pleading stage, due to a strict pleading bar, discovery is not even an option.103
Relators who are held to a strict pleading standard under Rule 9(b)
in FCA cases experience the same adverse effects that plaintiffs
complained of after the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly 104 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 105 which required plaintiffs to
include far more detailed facts in a complaint to survive a motion to
dismiss.106 Here too, relators would be adversely affected because they
would be forced to provide more detailed facts than they have available
to them, causing their case to be dismissed before it can be evaluated
on the merits. Studies show that the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Twombly and Iqbal have led to increased dismissals at the motion to
dismiss stage. 107 A strict application of Rule 9(b), which requires

98.

Id.

99.

Id. at 156–57.

100. Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 190–91.
101. Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 53, 68 (2010).
102. Id.
103. Leslie A. Gordon, For Federal Plaintiffs, Twombly and Iqbal Still Present
a Catch-22, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2011, at 16, 17.
104. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
105. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
106. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. 544; Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 662.
107. Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Plaintiphobia in the Supreme
Court, 100 Cornell L. Rev. 193, 196, 201 (2014).
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relators to plead details they do not have access to, simply places an
unfair burden on relators.
Finally, requiring a relator to plead representative samples would
discourage relators from coming forward with information of false
claims.108 An inflexible application of Rule 9(b) would “take[] a big bite
out of qui tam litigation” because a relator is unlikely to have access to
these documents unless he works in the defendant’s billing department.109
B.

The Test

In order to have a consistent, predictable application of Rule 9(b),
courts should adopt a uniform, flexible standard. The focus of this test
should be on whether the relator provided (1) details of the overall
scheme and (2) indicia of reliability. In applying Rule 9(b), “courts
must undertake a case-by-case analysis of particular pleadings;” 110
however, a relator’s complaint is sufficient if the “accusations are not
vague”111 and the defendants can “defend against the charge and not
just deny that they have done anything wrong.” 112 Representative
examples of each individual false claim submitted are not required if
the relator details the overall fraudulent scheme and provides an
adequate basis for the court to infer that false claims were actually
submitted to the government.
1.

Prong One: Details of the Overall Scheme

This prong of the test can be satisfied by pleading the when, where,
how, and what of the overall fraudulent scheme. This prong looks at
the scheme in general because “[t]he particular circumstances constituting the fraudulent presentment are often harbored in the scheme.”113
The Fifth Circuit has stated as much:
Standing alone, raw bills—even with numbers, dates, and
amounts—are not fraud without an underlying scheme to submit
the bills for unperformed or unnecessary work. It is the scheme in
108. See Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 191 (“It discourages whistleblowers who may
have significant information from coming forward . . . .”).
109. United States ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 570 F.3d 849, 854
(7th Cir. 2009).
110. United States ex rel. Folliard v. CDW Tech. Servs., Inc., 722 F. Supp. 2d
20, 33 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting In re Orion Sec. Litig., No. 08–CV–1328,
2009 WL 2601952, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2009)).
111. Lusby, 570 F.3d at 855.
112. United States ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 389 F.3d
1251, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting United States ex rel. Lee v.
SmithKline Beecham, Inc., 245 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001)).
113. Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 190.
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which particular circumstances constituting fraud may be found
that make it highly likely the fraud was consummated through
the presentment of false bills.114

A relator can satisfy this prong by alleging how the fraud was
carried out as well as the “date, place, and participants” of the fraud.115
Even if a relator cannot match every fraudulent act with a specific
request for payment to the government, the complaint can provide
sufficient details of the overall scheme if, for example, the relator alleges
which employees submitted the false claims, which government regulation or contract was violated, when the requests were made, and
how the regulation or contract was violated.116 For example, the relator
in Thayer satisfied this prong by providing the names of the individuals
who instructed her to commit the fraudulent acts, the time period over
which the fraud took place, which clinics participated in the schemes,
and the means by which the fraud was executed.117
2.

Prong Two: Indicia of Reliability

The next prong of the test evaluates the indicia of reliability. The
indicia of reliability can be any “factual or statistical evidence to
strengthen the inference of fraud beyond possibility.”118 Any adequate
basis from which the court can infer that false claims were actually
submitted to the government should be considered sufficient indicia of
reliability. Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement does not necessarily
need to be met by stating the exact contents of a bill to the government.119 If a relator provides the underlying factual basis for the allegations in the complaint, then the second prong of the two-part test is
satisfied.

114. Id.
115. Id. at 191–92.
116. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 614
F.3d 1163, 1173 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding a former employee’s claims that
the former employer directed the employee to participate in fraud, that
the former employer breached its contractual and statutory obligations,
and that the former employer submitted false certifications of fulfillment
of those obligations sufficient to pass pleading stage).
117. United States ex rel. Thayer v. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, 765
F.3d 914, 919 (8th Cir. 2014).
118. See United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, Inc., 507 F.3d 720, 733 (1st Cir.
2007) (holding the relator’s claims were not sufficient because they
contained no factual or statistical evidence to strengthen the fraud
inference beyond possibility).
119. See Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 190 (holding that a relator’s complaint which does
not allege the details of a submitted false claim may nevertheless survive).
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A relator can satisfy this prong in many ways; however, no matter
how the second prong is satisfied, it is imperative that the notice to the
defendant requirement is fulfilled. First, personal knowledge of the
fraud can satisfy the indicia of reliability requirement.120 In Lemmon,
the relator satisfied this prong of the test through his personal
knowledge of the false claims. His personal knowledge was sufficient
because he participated in the improper disposal of the waste. 121
Similarly, in Grubbs, the relator satisfied this prong by alleging his
firsthand experience of the doctors approaching to participate in the
fraud and the nursing staff attempting to assist him in recording patient
visits that had not occurred.122
Second, specific contents of actually submitted claims, such as
billing numbers, dates, and amounts can satisfy the indicia of reliability
requirement. Although the relator in Clausen described in detail a
fraudulent scheme, his complaint was insufficient because it did not
provide “any billing information to support [Clausen’s] allegation that
actual false claims were submitted for payment.”123 Where the realtor
merely alleged, “these practices resulted in the submission of false
claims for payment to the United States,”124 the court wanted contents
of actually submitted false claims stating, “[n]o amounts of charges were
identified. No actual dates were alleged. No policies about billing or
even second-hand information about billing practices were described. . . . No copy of a single bill or payment was provided.”125
Finally, details about the defendant’s billing practices can satisfy
the indicia of reliability requirement. In Thayer, the relator alleged that
her position as manager gave her access to Planned Parenthood’s
centralized billing system. 126 She also alleged that she had personal

120. See United States ex rel. Ebeid v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir.
2010) (stating that the FCA is “geared primarily to encourage insiders to
disclose information necessary to prevent fraud on the government”); see
also Hill v. Morehouse Med. Assocs., No. 02-14429, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS
27956, at *14-15 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating that because the relator
“worked in the very department where she alleged the fraudulent billing
schemes occurred,” she was “privy to . . . the internal billing practices”
of the defendant and her allegations of false claims were factually credible).
121. United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 614 F.3d 1163,
1169, 1172–73 (10th Cir. 2010).
122. Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 184, 191–92.
123. United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301, 1306
(11th Cir. 2002).
124. Id. at 1312.
125. Id.
126. United States ex rel. Thayer v. Planned Parenthood of the Heartland,
765 F.3d 914, 919 (8th Cir. 2014).
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knowledge of the submission of false claims and described Planned
Parenthood’s general billing practices.127 These allegations were enough
to satisfy the indicia of reliability requirement.128
In sum, personal knowledge, specific details of submitted claims,
and details of the defendants billing practices are all ways in which a
relator can provide indicia of reliability to satisfy the second prong of
the test. This is contrary to the rule used in circuits that have adopted
the representative samples approach or the status of the relator
approach because those circuits held that a relator can provide indicia
of reliability in only one manner. Courts should accept personal
knowledge, representative samples, or details of the defendant’s billing
practices as sufficient to satisfy the second prong of the test instead of
limiting relators to just one method. The courts that have restricted
relators to only one method of showing indicia of reliably are incorrect
because any of the three methods discussed above would put a
defendant on notice of the claims.
3.

The Status of the Relator Approach Should be Rejected

A relator should not be held to a more flexible pleading standard
simply because a court finds that he had personal, firsthand knowledge
of the claims or classifies him as an “insider.” In affirming the dismissal
of a complaint for failure to meet Rule 9(b), the Eighth Circuit stated
that “[t]he [FCA] is intended to encourage individuals who are either
close observers or involved in the fraudulent, activity to come forward,
and is not intended to create windfalls for people with secondhand
knowledge of the wrongdoing.”129 Although it is important to keep in
mind that the objective of uncovering fraud must be balanced against
the fact that the ability to bring whistleblower claims may prompt
employees to pursue selfish motives or opportunistic behaviors, a person

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. United States ex rel. Kinney v. Stoltz, 327 F.3d 671, 674 (8th Cir. 2003).
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can provide reliable indicia without having firsthand knowledge. 130
Courts must hold all relators to the same standard.131
The FCA does not require that a relator be an insider to bring suit;
anyone who is aware of false claims against the government may bring
suit.132 Accordingly, “[i]t is generally contemplated that an FCA relator
will be an insider, and Congress certainly intended to encourage insider
whistleblowers to initiate qui tam suits. However, the statute contains
no such requirement.”133 The application of either a rigid or a flexible
pleading standard merely on the basis of the relator’s status is arbitrary
and distracting. For example, the Eighth Circuit only allows a more
flexible pleading standard for a relator who has firsthand knowledge of
the submission of the false claims.134 Specifically, the court required the
relator to plead representative samples in Joshi, but not in Thayer
because the relator was an “insider.”135 The Eighth Circuit applies a
more lenient pleading standard when the relator has firsthand
knowledge of the actual submission of the false claims. Therefore,
someone who works in the billing department at a hospital would have
a more flexible pleading standard than a doctor in that same hospital.

130. United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645,
649 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“Seeking the golden mean between adequate incentives
for whistle-blowing insiders with genuinely valuable information and
discouragement of opportunistic plaintiffs who have no significant information to contribute of their own, Congress has frequently altered its course
in drafting and amending the qui tam provisions since initial passage of the
FCA over a century ago.”); United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech
Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 2009) (“Congress has amended the
FCA several times ‘to walk a fine line between encouraging whistle-blowing
and discouraging opportunistic behavior.’” (citing United States ex rel. S.
Prawer and Co. v. Fleet Bank, 24 F.3d 320, 324–26 (1st Cir. 1994)).
131. Again, this excludes relators who receive their information through public
knowledge and are thus subject to the “original source” rule. 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(e)(4) (2012); see supra note 48.
132. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2012) (setting forth a limitation on who can bring
suit and stating that a court must dismiss a claim based on publicly
disclosed information unless the relator is the original source).
133. United States ex rel. McCready v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp, 251
F. Supp. 2d 114, 119 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing United States ex rel. LaCorte
v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Labs, 149 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 1998)).
134. Compare United States ex rel. Thayer v. Planned Parenthood of the
Heartland, 765 F.3d 914, 917 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that a flexible
standard applied when the relator was the center manager of the defendant
who oversaw the defendant’s billing system) with United States ex rel.
Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552, 557 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding
that a relator, as the defendant hospital’s anesthesiologist, must provide
specific details of the claim in order to receive a relaxed pleading standard).
135. Thayer, 765 F.3d at 917 (discussing Joshi, 441 F.3d at 557).
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The FCA does not differentiate based on the status of the relator.
Some courts have recognized that making a distinction based on the
status of the relator is arbitrary. The court’s holding in United States
ex rel. Folliard v. CDW Technology Services, Inc.136 is illustrative of
this:
[The defendant] asserts that Congress created a policy in the FCA
that relators must be insiders. This is not the case. . . . [T]he
statute contains no such requirement. Any person who can muster
sufficient evidence of fraud, that is not publicly disclosed, and be
the first to file a complaint alleging that fraud, may maintain a
qui tam suit. In fact, the statute contemplates that a competitor—
manifestly not an insider—may file suit.137

Similarly, the District Court for the District of Columbia in United
States ex rel. McCready v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp.,138 rejected
the notion that a relator must be an insider.139
C.

Courts Have Accepted a More Flexible Application of Rule 9(b) in
Other Instances of Alleged Fraud

FCA suits are not the only area of the law in which courts have
allowed a more flexible pleading standard. Courts that have allowed a
flexible application of Rule 9(b) have mainly done so in instances where
the plaintiff would be prejudiced because the defendant possesses the
information that the plaintiff needs in order to plead with specificity.
Some courts have allowed a more lenient application of Rule 9(b)
to complaints alleging violation of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (PSLRA).140 For example, in Jones v. Intelli-Check, Inc.,141
the court recognized that plaintiffs may not be able to provide
representative samples in market manipulation claims under the
PSLRA because the information needed may be “peculiarly within the
defendant’s knowledge or control.”142 Therefore, the court relaxed the

136. United States ex rel. Folliard v. CDW Tech. Servs., Inc., 722 F. Supp. 2d 20
(D.D.C. 2010).
137. Folliard., 722 F. Supp. 2d at 30 n.9 (citing United States ex rel. McCready v.
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 251 F. Supp. 2d 114, 119 (D.D.C. 2003)).
138. 251 F. Supp. 2d 114 (D.D.C. 2003).
139. Id. at 119.
140. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2012).
141. Jones v. Intelli-Check, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 615 (D.N.J. 2003).
142. Id. at 628 (quoting In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 311 F.3d
198, 216 (3d Cir. 2002)); see Damian Moos, Note, Pleading Around the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Reevaluating the Pleading
Requirements for Market Manipulation Claims, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 763,
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pleading requirement.143 Further, the court in In re Herbalife Securities
Litigation144 noted that the Ninth Circuit relaxed Rule 9(b)’s requirements when the “matters at issue are within the opposing party’s knowledge.”145 “In such cases, the particularity requirement may be satisfied
if the allegations are accompanied by a statement of the facts upon
which belief is founded.”146
There are several other areas in which courts have applied a relaxed
Rule 9(b) standard. First, one court held that a Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint “need not be specific
as to each allegation of mail or wire fraud when the nature of the RICO
scheme is sufficiently pleaded so as to give notice to the defendants.”147
In the context of a breach of contract case one court stated, “[a]lthough
Rule 9(b) requires heightened specificity, courts should apply the rule
with flexibility and ‘should not require plaintiffs to plead issues that
may have been concealed by the defendants.’”148 Furthermore, in a complaint alleging a securities law violation, one court held that Rule 9(b)
is relaxed to permit discovery where the evidence is within a defendant’s
exclusive possession. 149 Finally, Rule 9(b) apples to adversary bankruptcy proceedings;150 however, only a very simple allegation of fraud is
enough to satisfy the Rule 9(b) requirement.151
These courts have mainly focused on the fact that if the pleading
standard is not relaxed, an undue burden will be placed on the plaintiff
because the defendant is in possession of the information needed to
provide representative samples—the same problem that FCA relators
face in jurisdictions with an inflexible pleading standard.

777–87 (2004) (advocating for a relaxed application of Rule 9(b) in market
manipulation claims under the PSLRA).
143. Jones, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 628–29.
144. In re Herbalife Sec. Litig., No. CV 95-400 SVW, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11484
(C.D. Cal. 1996).
145. Id. at *18 (citing Wool v. Tandem Computers, 818 F.2d 1433, 1439
(9th Cir. 1987)).
146. Id. (citing Wool, 818 F.2d at 1439).
147. Karreman v. Evergreen Int’l Spot Trading, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 9824, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17812, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing First Interregional
Advisors Corp. v. Wolff, 956 F. Supp. 480, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
148. Mardini v. Viking Freight, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 378, 385 (D.N.J. 1999) (citing
Christidis v. First Pa. Mortg. Trust, 717 F.2d 96, 99–100 (3d Cir. 1983)).
149. Deutsch v. Flannery, 823 F.2d 1361, 1366 (9th Cir. 1987).
150. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7009.
151. See, e.g., In re Tarragon Corp., No. 09-10555, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 1001,
at *10 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2011) (construing Rule 9(b) “liberally” because a
sophisticated defrauder could hide sufficient details of the fraud to make
specific, particularized pleading impossible).
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Conclusion
The circuit courts have been inconsistent in their application of the
Rule 9(b) particularity requirement to FCA complaints. Due to the
lack of a specific test that can be applied to all relators’ complaints and
specific criteria that can be applied in evaluating whether the test has
been met, a relator’s complaint may be sufficient in one circuit but
insufficient in another. Circuits that hold relators to an inflexible
Rule 9(b) pleading standard are unfairly prejudicing relators who do
not have access to information that is in the hands of the defendant.
Therefore, the representative samples approach and the status of the
relator approach should be rejected.
When evaluating a relator’s complaint every court should consider
whether the relator sufficiently alleged: (1) details of the overall
fraudulent scheme and (2) indicia of reliability. Personal knowledge,
specific details of submitted claims, or details of the defendants billing
practices could fulfill the second prong. The two-part test will fulfill the
purpose behind the enactment of Rule 9(b)—to put the defendant on
notice of the allegations. It will also improve access to the judicial
system for relators and allow the FCA to fulfill its remedial purpose.
The test will ensure that the relator had reliable information that false
claims were submitted without barring relators who cannot gain access
to exact details like invoice numbers, dates, and dollar amounts.
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